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Abstract
In a recent but well known paper (see [2]), Reny proved the exis-
tence of Nash equilibria for better-reply-secure games, with possibly
discontinuous payoff functions. Reny’s proof is purely existential, and
is similar to a contradiction proof: it gives no hint of a method to
compute a Nash equilibrium in the class of games considered.
In this paper, we adapt the arguments of Reny in order to obtain,
for better-reply-secure games:
1) An elementary proof of Nash equilibria existence, which is a
consequence of Kakutani’s theorem.
2) A ”constructive” proof, in the sense that we obtain Nash equi-
libria as limits of fixed-point of well chosen correspondences.
To obtain a ”constructive” proof, one has to add a new assumption
on the strategy sets: one will suppose that they are Lindeloff spaces,
a property which is very general (for example, it is true in the case of
separable metric spaces).
This property seems important to obtain a constructive proof: no-
tice that a slight adaptation of our proof provides an elementary (but
purely existential) proof of Reny’s result in the case where the strategy
sets are not Lindeloff spaces.
∗Je remercie Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Pascal Gourdel et Hakim Hammami pour les dis-
cussions et remarques concernant soit cet article, soit l’article de Reny.
†CERMSEM, France. E-mail : bich@ceremade.dauphine.fr.
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1 Introduction
In a recent but well known paper (see [2]), Reny proved the existence of Nash
equilibria for better-reply-secure games, with possibly discontinuous payoff
functions. Reny’s proof is purely existential, and is similar to a contradiction
proof: it gives no hint of a method to compute a Nash equilibrium in the
class of games considered.
More precisely, Reny shows that finding a Nash equilibrium is equivalent
to finding some element of a infinite intersection of closed subsets E(x) (where
x ∈ X) of a compact set Γ (see [2], p. 1037, line 6).
Then, from the compactness assumption, he remarks that proving the
existence of an element in ∩x∈XE(x) is equivalent to proving that for every
finite subset I of X, one has ∩x∈IE(x) 6= ∅.
Finally he constructs, for every finite subset I of X, an element sI in
∩x∈IE(x), as limits of fixed points of well-chosen correspondances. But it
is not sure, if X is not countable, that there exists some sequences In ⊂ X
such that sIn converges to an elements of ∩x∈XE(x) 6= ∅: thus Reny’proof
assures that ∩x∈XE(x) is not empty, but it does not say how to compute an
element in ∩x∈XE(x) (and so a Nash equilibrium).
In this paper, we adapt the arguments of Reny in order to obtain, for
better-reply-secure games:
1) An elementary proof of Nash equilibria existence, which is a conse-
quence of Kakutani’s theorem, and does not rests (as Reny’s proof) on the
existence of Nash equilibria for some well chosen continuous.
2) A ”constructive” proof, in the sense that we obtain Nash equilibria as
limits of fixed-points of well chosen correspondences.
To obtain a ”constructive” proof, one has to add a new assumption on
the strategy sets: one will suppose that they are Lindeloff spaces, a property
which is very general (for example, it is true in the case of separable metric
spaces).
This property seems important to obtain a constructive proof: notice
that a slight adaptation of our proof provides an elementary (but purely
existential) proof of Reny’s result in the case where the strategy sets are not
Lindeloff spaces.
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2 Better reply secure games
Let consider N players. Each player i has a pure strategy set Xi, a non
empty and compact subset of a metric space, and a bounded payoff function
ui : X =
N∏
i=1
Xi → IR.
The symbol −i denotes ”all the players but i”, i.e. for every x ∈ X, one will
denote
x−i = (xj)j 6=i,
and
X−i = Πj 6=iXj.
Let suppose that for every i = 1, ..., N and every x−i ∈ X−i, the mapping
ui(., x−i) is quasiconcave.
In the following, a game satisfying these assumptions will be called a
compact and quasiconcave game.
Let u = (u1, ..., uN) and let
Γ = {(x, u(x)), x ∈ X},
which is clearly a compact subset of X × IRN from the assumptions above.
As in Reny [2], one defines the following notion
Definition 2.1 Player i can secure a payoff ui ∈ IR at x = (xi, x−i) ∈ X if
there exists x′i ∈ Xi and Vx−i, an open neighborhood of x−i, such that
∀x′−i ∈ Vx−i , ui(x′i, x′−i) ≥ ui.
A game G is said to be better reply secure if for every (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ such
that x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, some player i can secure a payoff strictly
above u∗i .
It is easy to see that a game is better reply secure if for every (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ
such that x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a player i such that
sup
xi∈Xi
lim
x−i→x∗−i
inf ui(xi, x−i) > u∗i .
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In the following,
ui(xi, x−i) = lim inf
x′−i→x−i
ui(xi, x
′
−i).
One of the key result of the proof is the following lemma, which will allow
to restrict oneself, in some sense, to countable strategies sets.
Lemma 2.2 There exists a countable set
∏N
i=1X
′
i ⊂ X such that for every
(x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ such that x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists i ∈ {1, ..., N}
such that
supxi∈X′i ui(xi, x
∗
−i) > u
∗
i .
The proof of this lemma rests on Lindeloff theorem, which we now recall.
Theorem 2.3 (Lindeloff Theorem) Let X be a separable metric space
(which means that there exists C, a countable and dense subset of X). Then
X is a Lindeloff space, i.e. every open cover of X has a countable subcover
Proof of Lemma 1.2. Let Γequ = {(x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ, x∗ is an equilibrium} and
Γnequ = {(x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ, x∗ is not an equilibrium} =c Γequ.
For every (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γnequ, from the better reply secure assumption, for
some player i and for some strategy a ∈ Xi, one has
u∗i < ui(a, x
∗
−i).
Since ui is l.s.c. with respect to x−i (from its definition), this last condition
remains true for every (x, u) ∈ Vx∗,u∗(a), an open neighborhood of (x∗, u∗) in
Γnequ well chosen.
Since Γ is a compact subset of a metric space, it is separable. Thus
Γnequ, as a subset of a separable metric space, is separable. Thus, it is a
Lindeloff space, i.e. every open cover of Γnequ has a countable subcover. Thus,
there exists a countable covering O of Γnequ by some open neighborhoods
Vx∗(j),u∗(j)(a(j)) (where (x
∗(j), u∗(j)) ∈ Γ and a(j) ∈ ∪Ni=1Xi for every j ∈
IN), which allows to define
X ′i = {a(j), j ∈ IN} ∩Xi
if it is nonempty, and X ′i be any point of Xi otherwise. It clearly satisfies
what we want.
4
3 A constructive proof of Reny’s theorem
The aim of this paper is to give a constructive and elementary proof of the
following theorem, proved by Reny [2]:
Theorem 3.1 If G is a compact, quasiconcave and better reply secure game,
then it admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. First, let X ′ = ΠNi=1X
′
i, where X
′
i is defined in Lemma 1.2. Since X
′
is countable, one can consider an increasing sequence of finite subsets
Xn =
N∏
i=1
Xni
of X such that
∪nXn = X ′.
Now, one recalls that for each i = 1, ..., N , and since ui(xi, x−i) is a l.s.c.
mapping (with respect to x−i), for every xi ∈ Xi and every i = 1, ..., N ,
there exists a sequence uni (xi, .) continuous (upon .) with:
uni (xi, x−i) ≤ ui(xi, x−i) (1)
and such that if xn−i converges to x−i then
lim infn u
n
i (xi, x
n
−i) ≥ ui(xi, x−i) (2)
(See Reny [2] for a proof of the existence of such sequence).
Let us now consider the correspondance Φn from coXn to coXn, defined by
Φn(x) = co{x′ ∈ Xn,∀a ∈ Xn,∀i = 1, ...N, uni (x′i, xn−i) ≥ uni (ai, xn−i)}. (3)
The correspondance Φn easily satisfies the assumptions of Kakutani’s
theorem:
1) It has convex values (from its definition).
2) It has nonempty values: indeed, for every i = 1, ..., N and every x ∈ X,
and since the set Xn is finite, there exists x¯i ∈ Xni such that
uni (x¯i, x−i) = Argmaxai∈Xni u
n
i (ai, x−i)
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and one has x¯ = (x¯1, ..., x¯N) ∈ Φn(x).
3) It has a closed graph, which is an easy consequence of the continuity
of uni with respect to the second variable, and the fact that X
n is finite.
Thus, from Kakutani’s Theorem, there exists xn ∈ co(Xn) which is a
fixed point of Φn. It means that there exists x′(1), ...x′(K) in Xn such that
for every k = 1, ..., K,
∀a ∈ Xn,∀i = 1, ...N, uni (x′i(k), xn−i) ≥ uni (ai, xn−i) (4)
and such that
xn ∈ co{x′(1), ..., x′(K)} (5)
From Equations (1) and from ui ≤ ui, one obtains
∀a ∈ Xn,∀i = 1, ...N, ui(x′i(k), xn−i) ≥ uni (ai, xn−i) (6)
Now, from the quasi-concavity of ui with respect to the first variable and
from Equation (5), one obtains
∀a ∈ Xn,∀i = 1, ...N, ui(xni , xn−i) ≥ uni (ai, xn−i) (7)
One can suppose (extracting a subsequence if necessary) that (xn, u(xn)),
which is a sequence of the compact set Γ, converges to (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ. Taking
the lower limit in Equation (8) and from Equation (2), one obtains
∀a ∈ ∪nXn = X ′,∀i = 1, ...N, u∗i ≥ ui(ai, x∗−i) (8)
which proves, from the choice of X ′, that (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γequ, i.e. that x∗ is a
Nash-equilibrium.
4 Extension to non-metric spaces
The framework adopted in this article is slightly less general than Reny’s
framework, since we suppose that the strategy sets are metric spaces. But
this plays no real role in the proof: the only important point is that each
strategy set needs to be a lindeloff space, which is a restriction that Reny
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does not impose. Imposing this very general condition allows us to obtain a
constructive proof.
Anyway, one could easily adapt the proof above in order to obtain a
simple (non constructive) proof of Reny’s Theorem, without imposing that
the strategy sets are Lindeloff spaces. Indeed, suppose that there does not
exist a Nash equilibrium under the assumptions of Reny’s Theorem. Then
the set Γnequ = Γ is compact. Thus, without using Lindeloff Theorem, one
obtain the following new version of Lemma 1.2.:
Lemma 4.1 If there does not exist a Nash equilibrium, then there exists a
finite set
∏N
i=1X
′
i ⊂ X such that for every (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ, there exists i ∈
{1, ..., N} such that
supxi∈X′i ui(xi, x
∗
−i) > u
∗
i .
This allows to finish the proof as above (taking Xn = X ′ in the proof).
The main difference with section 3. is that in that case, Equation (8) allows
only to yield a contradiction with the assumption that there does not exist
a Nash equilibrium, but x∗ in Equation (8) may not be a Nash equilibrium.
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